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Strategic Warning Staff Weshington, J.C. 2010



9 January 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING

SUBJECT: The Problem of Strategic Warning and the Continuing Tension in Poland

- 1. Attached is a short paper prepared by the Strategic Warning Staff that explores some of the implications of the Polish situation for strategic warning of a Soviet intervention. There is some discussion of events of the recent past leading to the present situation but the intention of the authors of the paper was to concentrate on the warning environment of the near future.
- 2. I understand that NFAC is in the process of producing some kind of paper that will probably cover some of the same subject area. Because of the NFAC project we have no specific plans to publish the attached paper. Nonetheless, we stand ready to publish an updated version of the attached if you think it would satisfy some specific questions not addressed by the NFAC project.

Director, SWS

Attachment



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	The Soviets and the Polish Problem	
	Key Judgements	
apparent readines of the basic stak b reak ou t during	may still invade Poland. The recent falloff in Moscom's is to resort to force does not alter the Soviet perception ses-party control and security. If massive new strikes the next few weeks, the USSR is unlikely to continue its via's fading effort to tame the unions.	
The implicat	tions for warning of the present Polish problem are neveral:	
- The i	internal conditions contributing to Moscow's concern pursist.	
- The S readiness in earl prepared to inter	Soviet and Czech military forces brought to a high state of ly September around the border of Poland continue to be vene.	
- Deter political situati	rioration of the present uneasy but evidently acceptable ion seems likely.	,
demands for polit	Polish party will probably not be able to control popular tical and economic renewal except with the sustained be independent unions and the Church.	
be able to stem t	is some chance that even the unions and the Church may not the tide of popular dissatisfaction with the performance of ument and economy, and that wide-spread disruption may result.	
that the Polish E	Soviets would probably intervene militarily if they perceived party had forfeited its basic authority to non-communist order to keep popular discontent under control.	
- The S Polish regime wer	Soviets almost certainly would intervene militarily if the re unable to maintain public order.	
beyond its contro least somewhat re	ear that Soviet policy is reacting to events in Poland largely ol. It seems equally clear that the Soviets have been at eluctant to use military force in Poland, a reluctance perhaps changed view that the cost of an intervention might be higher	
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has not be community	rt is the product of the Strategic Warning Staff and een coordinated with the rest of the intelligence. Questions or comments on this report should be to the Director, Strategic Warning Staff, Ext. 695-8031,	.:

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than earlier anticipated. Polish reactions to events of December of himse indicated to the Soviets both that stability might still be achieved as Polish terms and that military intervention might encounter far many to lish resistance than would be acceptable.		25 X 1
The first indication of a renewed danger of a military intervention would probably come as Moscow tried to respond to actions by the Poles themselves. Specifically important indicators are changes in the relations between the Polish party and the independent organizations, as well is the party's ability to maintain public order in the country. Other important actions to watch include increased political consultation and public criticisms of the deteriorating situation. Changes in the Soviet military posture would probably become evident, the more so as final preparations moved toward completion.		25X1 25X1
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	10. The intensity of the US and West European response to the possibility of Soviet intervention may also have been unexpected. While harboring no illusions about the current state of relations with Washington, Soviet Readers may well have given new consideration to the cost that a move against intensive would have in terms of relations with the incoming US administration. In any event, it now appears that Kania and his colleagues were given more time to prove that, on the basis of a seeming turn for the better inside the country, they could channel and eventually manipulate the new forces emerging in Poland.
	II. We believe that a new round of massive strikes in Poland, especially if triggered by political rather than economic demands, would convince the Soviets that the limits of tolerance had been breached beyond repair. Moscow would move quickly to restore the broad impression that decisive
	Soviet actions were imminent, at the same time stepping up pressure on the Polish party to break the unions by force and restore order. A less costly approach might be to engineer still one more change at the top in Poland hoping that criticism of the party, the government, and the economy could
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15. The overall situation in Poland remains precarious: Leaving aside the possibility that the Soviets (or the unions) might at some point actually want a confrontation, there is always the chance that a renewed crisis could arise as the result of unexpected events. A runaway strike movement that defies the authority of Walesa and his associates—for example, over the contentious issue of the five-day work week—is only the most apparent of the possibilities. The effects of such developments would be magnified if the popular demands were to take a predominately political cast and threaten the Party's control directly. There is scant evidence at this time of internal political bickering in Moscow over the Polish lissue, but such can hardle be ruled out as a possible future complication. A rare combination of decicities to compromise and devotion to declared values on the part of all parties to the conflict would be necessary to keep the threat of Soviet interventions from rising again in the weeks to come.

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